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Introduction 1
The study of the impact of European integration on the polities, economies and societies of the Western Balkans has emerged as a subfield of the Europeanisation literature (cf. Sedelmeier 2011) . Although Croatia is on the cusp of EU membership and Montenegro started accession negotiations, the European path of other countries, such as Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, remains contested, despite the EU's long-standing commitment, engagement and investment in the region (Gordon 2010) . Consequently, scholars and practitioners have begun to ponder whether the 'accession magic' can work again as it did in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Grabbe 2009)? Existing rational institutionalist and sociological institutionalist theories have generated two approaches to tackling the puzzle of the EU's limited and differential transformative power in the Western Balkans. The rational institutionalist approach is 1 Acknowledgements: I thank members of the South East Europe Working Group of the British International Studies Association (BISA) and Mary Martin for their useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their pertinent remarks and helpful suggestions.
informed by Goetz's (2005, p. 262) notion of Europeanisation as 'shallow institutionalisation', capturing a disconnect between rule adoption and rule implementation. In this view, the transposition of European rules into domestic institutions is not accompanied by appropriate adaptation of practices and behaviour.
The actors' formal response to external incentives goes hand in hand with full or partial resistance to the adaptation costs (Börzel 2011; Elbasani 2009) , not unlike in CEE and the Eastern Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria), both during accession and post-accession stages (Dimitrova 2010) . The sociological institutionalist approach, contrastingly, uses divergence in identities and norms to explain either stalled Europeanisation (Subotić 2011) or fake, partial, or imposed compliance (Noutcheva 2009 ).
This article provides an alternative explanation of the complexity of Europeanisation in the Western Balkans from a discursive institutionalist perspective. A discursive analysis of policy adaptation required for Serbia's visa liberalisation, including additional requests made on Serbia with a profound impact on its Kosovo policy, demonstrates that the European rules were adopted and enforced, but that the policy adaptation was denied in the discourse. Such a disconnect between discursive conception of norms, as opposed to their formal conception (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005, p. 8) , has thus far been overlooked in existing explanations of 'shallow' Europeanisation in the Western Balkans. Empirical findings presented in this article question the propositions that, on the one hand, the rational cost-benefit calculation of actors, and, on the other hand, socialisation as well as norm and identity convergence or divergence, are reliable predictors of the full scope of the domestic adjustment. The discursive institutionalist perspective provides an analytical tool to capture the incoherence and complexity of domestic adaptation in different domains of Europeanisation. Operationalising the discursive institutionalist perspective, the article contributes to the study of ideational and discursive mechanisms as an explanation of domestic adaptation in the context of European integration (Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2012, p. 33) . Engaging the scholarship which posits that 'ideas can become major causal factors that help explain major political processes' (Béland & Cox 2011, p. 15) , the findings confirm a need to understand further the role of 'discursive incoherence and conflict as mechanism(s) of Europeanization' (Lynggaard 2012, p. 97) .
In research design, this explanation of complexity of Serbia's Europeanisation departs from the analysis of domestic adaptation limited to the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the EU's pre-accession instrument for the Western Balkans. I suggest that the exclusive focus on the SAP is much too narrow either to capture comprehensively the extent of domestic change in the Western Balkans or to explain resistance to it. Also, the literature on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the Western Balkans, has been largely limited to the study of security dividends of EU policies, such as broader trends in the SAP or conflict resolution (Noutcheva 2009; Coppetiers et al. 2004) , without considering the ESDP's impact on specific policy areas within the SAP, including their scope and variability.
Yet, Hughes (2010, p. 7) notes the tension arising from 'the EU attempts to combine simultaneously policies that are not always compatible: containing, and moving beyond conflict, while also advancing the process of accession for the countries involved'. Therefore, I premise the study of Serbia's Europeanisation on EU's complex actorness (cf. Papadimitriou, Petrov & Greiçevci 2007; Rosamund 2007, p. 249), which is disaggregated in the research design in order to investigate a crosspolicy impact resulting from EU's simultaneous involvement through the SAP and ESDP policy-envelopes in the Western Balkans. This is distinct from the study of domestic change driven simultaneously by the EU and other institutions such as NATO, OECD or World Bank (Grabbe 2001 (Grabbe , p. 1027 Wallace 2001, p. 12-3; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, p. 666; Aybet & Bieber 2011) . In sum, I
investigate whether the EU's engagement through multiple policy instruments furthers the goal of approximation to the EU.
Current findings by scholars who note the EU's multiple policy instruments in the Western Balkans lead to contradictory conclusions. Some argue that these instruments are a sign of the EU's strength in engaging the region (Vachudova 2003, p. 141; Montanaro-Jankovski 2007; Tocci 2007, p. 174) . Others point to their adverse effect, both on the approximation process and the EU's credibility in the region (Ilievski & Taleski 2010; Massari 2005) . The findings of this study fall in neither camp. Drawing on extensive primary evidence in the analysis of the EU's parallel engagement through the SAP and ESDP, the article points to a normative incongruence: policy convergence coexists with its discursive negation, including the rejection of European integration, which results in uneven Europeanisation between discourse and policy domains. The analysis reveals a complex pattern of Europeanisation in Serbia, simultaneously denoting approximation and resistance. It demonstrates the EU's leverage to induce domestic change, but not in ways that would be expected or predicted comprehensively by RI or SI. This article first sets out a discursive institutionalist approach to the study of Europeanisation by focusing on discursive causality alongside the research methodology used to track the EU's pursuit of the SAP and the ESDP in Serbia and Kosovo. After providing some background to the EU's involvement in Serbia, the article goes on to present empirical evidence on policy adaptation as a form of Europeanisation and demonstrates a cross-policy impact. A discursive analysis of the cross-policy impact follows, revealing normative incongruence between discourse and policy. The next section evaluates empirical findings from sociological institutionalist, rational institutionalist and discursive institutionalist perspective. The qualitative method used in this article combines the analysis of discursive frames based on a systematic review of the Serbian media, 2 triangulated by conducting semistructured interviews with state officials and civil society actors involved in Serbia's visa liberalisation and EU integration, alongside process-tracing and secondary desktop research analysing EU documents as well as contracts with Serbia, including official Serbian documents and public opinion polls.
3 2 The qualitative analysis of discursive frames by key actors was deemed most appropriate for this case study due to repetition of statements by same actors in daily press, radio and TV outlets based on agency reports of the Beta, FoNet and Tanjug news agencies. The press review included key dailies Danas, Politika, Glas javnosti, Blic; weeklies NIN and Vreme; reports by B92 (radio) and RTV Serbia (TV), whose news bulletins are published on their websites in 2007-2010. 3 The findings are part of a research project on Europeanisation of Serbia that includes extensive fieldwork alongside over 60 semi-structured and informal interviews, from
Europeanisation and discursive institutionalism
The concept of Europeanisation, minimally, denotes any domestic change in response to the policies of the European Union (Featherstone 2003, p. 3) . The paper relies on Radaelli's (2003, p. 30 ) definition of Europeanisation, referring to:
Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things," and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.
This definition extends Europeanisation as a concept (Mair 2004, p. 340) , while usefully distinguishing between different domains of Europeanisation: discourse and public policy (Radaelli 2003, Figure, 2.1, p. 35; cf. Börzel & Risse 2003, Figure 3.1, p. 60) . While analytically distinct, these two domains are linked through 'the role of discourse within processes of political change' (Radaelli & Schmidt 2004, p. 366) .
This paper adopts a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation and the study of discourse therein. The bottom-up approach 'starts and finishes at the level of domestic actors' (Radaelli & Pasquier 2007, p. 41) , and has methodological implications for the study 2006 to 2010. The criterion used for citation of interviews here is their direct relevance to visa liberalisation.
of the direction of a causal relation (Lynggaard 2011, p. 23) . The focus on the domestic arena addresses a gap in the literature on Europeanisation of postCommunist states (Sedelmeier 2011, p. 30; Fink-Hafner 2008) . Further, in line with the bottom-up approach, discourse is considered here in the national context.
However, the national discourse(s) are not analysed, following Diez (2001, p. 6) , in the narrow national sense, but as competing discourses indicative of Europeanisation and the extent of their effect on norms and polices.
This study applies discursive institutionalism (DI), elaborated by Schmidt (2008) , as an alternative to rational institutionalism (RI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) to explain Europeanisation. DI identifies the causal influence of discourse that follows the 'logic of communication', as opposed to the 'logic of consequentialism' and the 'logic of appropriateness' associated with RI and SI respectively. 4 The 'logic of communication' derives from the power of discourse to effect institutional change, while the explanation of its causal power is centred on agents, rather than on structure and incentives as in RI or norms as in SI. Furthermore, DI is distinguished from SI, with which it broadly shares a constructivist take on identity and ideas as endogenous and socially constructed. But, while SI treats ideas as static structures, ideas are treated as dynamic constructs in DI (Schmidt 2008, p. 320) . Schmidt (2008, p. 311 ) specifies that discourse is causally effective in two ways: as a representation of ideas and as a discursive process by which those ideas are conveyed. 4 Börzel's (2005, pp. 52-8) overview contextualises the two logics identified by Olsen (1989, 1998) in the field of European integration studies (Cf.
Checkel 1999; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004) .
Consequently, to consider Schmidt's transformative power of discourse as a mechanism, which explains a systematic relationship between two events, entails coherence and persuasion (Lynggaard 2012, p. 97) . As a representation, a discourse becomes successful if it has 'relevance to the issues at hand, adequacy, applicability, appropriateness and resonance' (Schmidt 2008, p. 311) . As a process of discursive interactions, it is more than an expression of one set of actors' interests or normative values because it serves 'to persuade others of the necessity and/or appropriateness of a given course of action' (Schmidt 2008, p, 312) . In sum, discourse has political consequences. It is a vehicle for legitimation of political ideas, including justifying the change of others' 'views of the world, their normative beliefs, their preferences and even their identities' (Risse 2000, p. 8) . This, in turn, influences policy prescription and policy production (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, p. 192) .
Therefore, scholars have assumed normative congruence between discourse and policy change or resistance. A lack of legitimating discourse was identified as an obstacle to policy change or elite socialisation (Schmidt 2007; Kratochvíl 2008; Dimitrova 2002) . The actor-centred approach to discursive practices revealed a range of European discourses in given policy areas (Thatcher 2004; Flockhart 2005; della Porta & Caiani 2006) , pointing to the contested nature of Europeanisation across countries, policies and over time (Liebert 2008) . However, this approach has not challenged the premise of normative congruence between discourse and policy outcome: actors' legitimating discourse will be favourable to policies advancing adaptation in line with EU rules and norms, and vice versa.
While discourse provides 'a repertoire of discursive resources in the form of available narratives and understandings at the disposal of political actors' (Hay & Rosamund 2002, pp. 151-52) , the consideration of discourse as a 'strategic choice' (Lynggaard 2012, p. 93; cf. Schimmelfennig 2001; Fouilleux 2004 ) calls for further critical analysis of discourse in relation to institutional change. To operationalise a 'sceptical bottom-up approach' along with an appropriate analytical framework 'able to accommodate a significant degree of complexity -indeed of incoherence' in
Europeanisation (Wincott 2004, p. 356) , this article contends that normative congruence between discourse and policy has to come under scrutiny.
Schmidt argues that DI can explain the unexpected 'because the unexpected may actually be expectable when analysis is based on a particular set of ideational rules and discursive regularities in a given meaning context following a particular logic of (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314) .' To build in the hypothesized incoherence in the discursive practice and policy production, this research is informed by Milliken's (1999, p. 243 ) juxtapositional method, that juxtaposes 'the 'truth' about a situation constructed within a particular discourse to events and issues that this 'truth' fails to acknowledge or address […] .' The type of discourse studied is 'communicative', relating to the political sphere encompassing a broader debate and deliberation on policy, as opposed to 'coordinative' discourse, circumscribed to policy actors and focusing on policy formulation (Schmidt 2008, p. 310-13) . Serbia fits the model of a 'simple' polity where the communicative discourse is more elaborate.
However, the dominance of one type of discourse does not preclude competition among discourses. Bolleyer & Radaelli (2009, p. 389 ) note that such 'competition implies a multi-actor notion of communicative discourse'. In other words, DI focuses on interactive processes involving discourse, while bringing in agency to the forefront of analysis, as opposed to the structure as in RI and norms as in SI (Schmidt 2008, pp. 304-5) . Ultimately, the aim of this article is to investigate and explain how discourse succeeds, i.e. has causal consequence(s). Discourse as a representation and discourse as an interactive process are used to account for domestic adaptation as an indicator of EU's leverage in Serbia. While considering the EU's parallel pursuit of the SAP and the ESDP, this article draws on distinction between two types of relations involving discourse: that between different discourses and that between discourse and policy. Therefore, instead of just asking how discourse induces policy change to advance Europeanisation as would be a case in the study of a single policy frame (Kallestrup 2002; Meyer 2005) 
Serbia's approximation to the European Union: SAP and ESDP
The SAP, the EU's policy instrument for engaging with the Western Balkans, Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Subotić 2010; Braniff 2011, pp. 123-38) . In addition, Serbia's approximation with the EU since Slobodan Milošević's fall in 2000
has been defined by instability of Serbia's borders, which triggered EU's increased involvement through the CFSP and ESDP alongside the SAP. Consequently, Serbia's Europeanisation has been shaped by the EU's simultaneous pursuit of policies in both areas (See Table 1 ).
Serbia's European journey has unfolded in fits and starts. Initially, the process of EU 
Visa liberalisation as Europeanisation in a policy domain
The Council of the European Union granted visa-free travel to and throughout the The visa liberalisation process from the Serbian point of view was an exemplary 'in miniature' exercise for how EU conditionality could work. There was a road map, the obligations were clear and, above all, the reward looked credible, effective and within reach.
7
The EU's perception of the Western Balkans as a possible source of instability and a shift towards desecuritisation of the region shaped the visa liberalisation process (Trauner 2007; Petrovic 2010 
Explaining the EU's leverage in Serbia
According to a Serbian interior affairs official, Serbia's policy both toward Kosovo 
Conclusion
This study contributes to the understanding of Europeanisation in post-communist states by identifying a hitherto overlooked disconnect between domestic adaptation in the discursive and policy domains. Specifically, with reference to Serbia, it exposes another variation of 'Potemkin harmonization', the term Jacoby (1999) On the one hand, the research findings highlight the 'shallow' nature of Europeanisation with implications for the 'lock-in of the institutional change' (Sedelmeier 2012, pp. 22-23) , given its discursive denial. On the other, they raise questions concerning the role of discourse in explaining domestic change.
Specifically, engagement in a methodological dialogue with RI is needed to better understand the impact of the changing incentive structures on what Schmidt (2008, p. 314) calls 'foreground discursive abilities', through which agents change or maintain institutions (cf. Béland & Cox 2011, p. 15) . Börzel & Risse's (2003, 57-89; Goetz 2005, p. 262; Jacoby 2004, pp. 196-215; Checkel 2001, p. 581) Approaching discourse as a cause rather than the cause in line with the discursive institutionalist take on causality as an 'empirical one showing when ideas and discourse matter and when they don't' (Schmidt 2011, p. 62) , this research sought to explain domestic adaptation in face of restrictive adaptation costs. It asked the question how ideas and interests interact and connect, rather than drawing a distinction between the materialist and idealist analysis (Campbell 2002, pp. 33-34) .
The identified normative incongruence as an explanation of a discursively generated policy change questions the applicability of the constitutive logic associated with constructivism (cf. Wendt 1999), and its emphasis on consistency of discourse with values and norms in accounts of policy change (cf. Bhatia & Coleman 2003) . This study thus reflects a need to 'proceed from the study of discursive causalities towards substantial causal claims' (Lynggaard 2011, p. 85) , which can entail rethinking of causality beyond the dualism between positivist and post-positivist approaches (Kurki 2006; Gofas & Hay 2010; Tønder 2010) . As Epstein notes (2008, p. 4) , the distinction between explaining and understanding 'precludes apprehending "meaning" as a cause of social action and as a factor of change and continuity, thereby undermining its explanatory purchase.'.
Lastly, this study shows that Europeanisation in the Western Balkans is complex and uneven across different dimensions of institutional change, and thus eludes simple assessment of the EU's multiple policies as either a failure or success. Such a conclusion reiterates the need to understand Europeanisation of what scholars call 'difficult' (Subotić 2010) , 'impossible' (Bieber 2011) and 'limited' states (Börzel 2011) , defined by complex political, ethnic and conflict legacy. From the 'goodness of fit' perspective, this concerns the extent to which the pursuit of multiple policies by the EU changes the scope of adaptation necessary to achieve the 'fit' as a result of cross-policy impact. It, therefore, requires rigorous research design that identifies and operationalises the sources of policy change in relation to their effect(s). In the Western Balkans, further understanding of EU conditionality is needed from a bottom-up perspective. The focus on domestic conditions, as mediators of EU leverage (Börzel 2011; Elbasani 2009 ), should also include consideration of the constantly shifting local policy context, which itself is partly caused by EU's multiple policy instruments. 
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